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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 14-1640 
____________ 
 
In re:  KEITH H. RESSLER, 
                                          Debtor 
 
 
CHRISTINE C. SHUBERT, as Chapter 7 Trustee  
for the Bankruptcy Estates of Keith Ressler  
and Kenneth L. Ressler and Karen Ressler, 
                                                                     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JACQUES H. GEISENBERGER, JR., PC;  
JACQUES H. GEISENBERGER, JR.;  
FRANCIS C. MUSSO, CPA, MPA, PC;  
FRANCIS C. MUSSO, CPA  
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-11-cv-07762) 
District Judge:  Cynthia M. Rufe 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 9, 2014 
 
Before:  FUENTES, FISHER and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: February 13, 2015) 
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____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Acting as Chapter 7 trustee for the bankruptcy estates of Keith Ressler, Karen 
Ressler, and Kenneth Ressler (collectively the “Resslers”), Christine Shubert appeals the 
order of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing her 
complaint for professional negligence, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and 
contribution under the Maryland Securities Act against Jacques H. Geisenberger, Jr., 
P.C.; attorney Jacques H. Geisenberger, Jr.; Francis C. Musso, CPA, MPA, P.C.; and 
accountant Francis C. Musso, CPA (collectively “Appellees”).  We will affirm.  
I. 
A. 
We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of the case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
The Resslers formerly owned and served as directors and officers for Ressler 
Hardwoods & Flooring, Inc. (“RHF”), a flooring business incorporated in Pennsylvania.  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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To alleviate cash flow problems during a time of financial distress, the Resslers sought to 
sell a 51% ownership interest in RHF to Maryland investor James Little for $1.2 million.   
During negotiations in early 2007, the Resslers failed to provide Little the 
company’s monthly financial reports and delivered Little a memorandum misrepresenting 
the extent to which RHF suffered financially.  In July 2007, the Resslers requested and 
Little advanced $400,000 towards toward the purchase of RHF’s shares contingent upon 
the successful negotiation of several agreements.  To consummate the purchase, the 
Resslers engaged the legal, financial, and accounting services of Appellees—an 
individual attorney and his law firm (the “Geisenberger Defendants”) and an individual 
accountant and his accounting firm (the “Musso Defendants”).   
Negotiations between the Resslers and Little subsequently broke down, and Little 
demanded that the Resslers return the $400,000 advance with interest.  Instead, in alleged 
reliance upon the Appellees’ direction, the Resslers issued Little shares in RHF in 
proportion to the funds advanced.  The Resslers allege that Appellees did not advise them 
of their legal or financial obligations to Little with respect to the share issuance.   
B. 
In January 2008, Little filed suit against the Resslers and RHF in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Maryland, alleging securities fraud in violation of the Maryland 
Securities Act, Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 11-101 et seq.   Several months later, 
RHF filed for bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of 
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Pennsylvania (the “MDPA Bankruptcy Court”), where Little’s case was then transferred.  
On March 19, 2010, the MDPA Bankruptcy Court entered a judgment for $400,000 plus 
interest against the Resslers and RHF, jointly and severally, for material 
misrepresentations and intentional omissions in connection with the share issuance.  The 
Resslers did not oppose Little’s motion to deem the judgment non-dischargeable and it 
was granted by default judgment.  
In June 2010, the Resslers individually filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (“EDPA Bankruptcy Court”). 
Shubert initiated an adversary proceeding against the Appellees in the EDPA Bankruptcy 
Court by reference from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
asserting claims of professional negligence, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, 
and contribution under the Maryland Securities Act.  Shubert alleged that the actions and 
omissions of Appellees caused the Resslers to lose the value of their interest as 
shareholders and investors in RHF and sustain a $400,000 judgment in bankruptcy, 
among other damages.  In September and October 2011, the Geisenberger and Musso 
Defendants moved to dismiss.  The District Court withdrew the reference consistent with 
a joint stipulation and the adversary proceeding was transferred to the District Court.   
In connection with RHF’s bankruptcy proceeding, RHF’s trustee filed parallel 
claims against the Appellees.  RHF’s trustee and the Appellees ultimately settled their 
  
5 
claims, and the MDPA Bankruptcy Court approved the settlement agreements, which 
contained a mutual release of all claims, in June 2012 and July 2013. 
The Geisenberger Defendants thereafter supplemented their pending motion to 
dismiss with a copy of its approved settlement agreement with RHF’s trustee.  The 
District Court granted the motion, finding that the Resslers’ injuries were derivative of 
RHF’s injuries and barred by the settlement agreement and release.  On March 12, 2014, 
the District Court denied reconsideration of its order and simultaneously granted the 
Musso Defendants’ motion to dismiss (as supplemented with its settlement agreement) 
for the same reasons.  This timely appeal followed.      
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 157 and 28 U.S.C. § 1334.  
We exercise jurisdiction over the District Court’s final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
Our review of a District Court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure is plenary.1  “We must accept all factual allegations in the 
complaint as true, construe the complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff, and 
ultimately determine whether plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable 
reading of the complaint.”2 
 
 
                                              
1 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). 
2 Id. 
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III. 
The derivative injury rule, relied on by the District Court, is a principle of standing 
that “holds that a shareholder . . . may not sue for personal injuries that result directly 
from injuries to the corporation.”3  The rule is premised on the separate legal existence of 
a corporation, in which shareholders shield themselves from the corporation’s liabilities 
and may not pierce the corporate veil in reverse to recover individually from the 
corporation’s losses.4  Accordingly, under established Pennsylvania law,5 a shareholder 
can avoid the derivative injury rule “[i]f the injury is one to the plaintiff as a stockholder 
and to him individually, and not to the corporation . . . .”6     
Shubert alleges that the Resslers were individually injured in two ways:  (A) first, 
that they were exposed to personal liability in the form of a joint-and-several judgment; 
and (B) second, that the Appellees breached individual professional, contractual, and 
fiduciary duties.  We discuss each exception to the derivative injury rule in turn and 
conclude, like the District Court, that an individual injury has not been adequately pled.7  
As such, Shubert’s claims are derivative in nature and cannot be maintained directly. 
                                              
3 In re Kaplan, 143 F.3d 807, 811-12 (3d Cir. 1998) (applying Illinois law).   
4 Id. at 812.   
5 To determine the derivative status of claims, we apply the law of the state of 
incorporation.   See 12B Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 5911 (2014). 
6 Fishkin v. Hi–Acres, Inc., 341 A.2d 95, 98 n.4 (Pa. 1975) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
7 Because the derivative status of Shubert’s claims decides the issues on appeal, 
we need not reach Appellees’ alternative grounds that their actions were not the 
proximate cause of the Resslers’ actions giving rise to Little’s lawsuit.  
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A. 
 “To have standing to sue individually, the shareholder must allege a direct, 
personal injury—that is independent of any injury to the corporation—and the 
shareholder must be entitled to receive the benefit of any recovery.”8  Shubert alleges that 
the $400,000 judgment entered against the Resslers jointly and severally is itself a form 
of direct injury that they are entitled to assert as shareholders.   
Shubert fails to show, however, that the Resslers’ injury is distinct from RHF’s 
injury or that the Resslers are entitled to recovery on this basis.  The $400,000 judgment 
remedies the harm sustained by Little for RHF’s violations of the Maryland Securities 
Act in connection with the share issuance; the Resslers were held jointly and severally 
liable for RHF’s misconduct as corporate officers executing that transaction by function 
of Maryland law.9  This fact does not transform RHF’s loss into direct, personal loss 
sustained by the Resslers as shareholders.  Just as shareholders lack standing for harms 
that arise out of corporate conduct on the basis of shared liability for corporate loans or 
tax liens, any such injury would be “dependent upon and derivative to the corporate 
injury.”10  Thus, Shubert cannot assert direct claims on this basis.    
 
 
                                              
8 Hill v. Ofalt, 85 A.3d 540, 548 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014).   
9 See Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass'ns § 11-703(c).   
10 Ofalt, 85 A.3d at 552.   
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B. 
Some courts also “permit[] a cause of action in favor of the individual 
shareholder[] where the alleged wrong violates a duty owed directly to the 
shareholder.”11  This exception to the derivative injury rule covers “dut[ies] owed to the 
individual independent of the person’s status as a shareholder . . . .”12  Here, Shubert 
alleges that the Appellees owed the Resslers certain professional, contractual, and 
fiduciary duties because Appellees had long-standing relationships with the Resslers, 
represented the Resslers individually in the Little transaction, and acted as agents on 
behalf of the Resslers personally. 
Conclusory assertions of supposed duties, however, will not survive a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion.13  The record makes clear that Appellees’ professional services were 
retained by the Resslers on behalf of the corporate entity, RHF, in its attempt to issue 
stock to Little; indeed, the allegations within the complaint arise from the Geisenberger 
and Musso Defendants’ purported role in that transaction.  On the other hand, nowhere 
does the complaint adequately allege that the Resslers engaged Appellees’ legal, 
accounting, or financial services for any reason independent of conducting RHF’s 
business in the Little transaction or the Resslers’ status as shareholders, officers, and 
directors of RHF.  Thus, Shubert does not have standing to sue directly on this basis. 
                                              
11 Cole v. Ford Motor Co., 566 F. Supp. 558, 569 (W.D. Pa. 1983).   
12  12B Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 5911 (2014); see also 
Ofalt, 85 A.3d at 549 (reiterating this principle).   
13 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).   
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IV. 
Because Shubert failed to allege that the Resslers sustained an injury independent 
of the injury to RHF, we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6). 
  
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. 
While I join in my colleagues’ decision to affirm, I respectfully cannot agree that 
the shareholder derivative injury rule, on which the majority and the District Court have 
relied, is what justifies that outcome.  I concur, however, because the complaint, in any 
event, fails to adequately allege causation.   
The derivative injury rule is a doctrine specific to plaintiffs who bring suits in their 
capacity as shareholders.  It derives from the well-settled tenet that “[t]he legal fiction of 
corporate existence corresponds with the view that an injury to the corporate body is 
legally distinct from an injury to another person.”1  Thus, the rule prevents shareholders 
from recovering individually for an injury to the corporation as a whole,2 but does not 
apply when the shareholder alleges “a direct, personal injury—that is independent of any 
injury to the corporation.”3   
Here, the complaint filed by Christine Shubert, as Trustee for the bankruptcy 
estate of Keith Ressler, Kenneth Ressler, and Karen Ressler (collectively the “Resslers”), 
                                              
 1 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 
348 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 
 2 See In re Kaplan, 143 F.3d 807, 811-12 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Moffatt Enters., 
Inc. v. Borden Inc., 807 F.2d 1169, 1177 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying Pennsylvania law and 
finding that shareholders who alleged they “sustained actual and consequential damages” 
along with injuries to the corporation, had standing to bring individual claims of, among 
other things, breach of fiduciary duties). 
 
 3 Hill v. Ofalt, 85 A.3d 540, 549 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (quoting 12B Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 5911 (2013)); see also Kaplan, 143 F.3d at 811-
12 (“The derivative injury rule holds that a shareholder (even a shareholder in a closely-
held corporation) may not sue for personal injuries that result directly from injuries to the 
corporation.”) (emphasis added). 
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alleges that, as a result of the malpractice of Appellees in advising the Resslers to issue 
stock to James Little, the Resslers were injured in two different ways: (1) the lost value of 
their investment in RHF; and (2) the $400,000 judgment that was entered against the 
Resslers in the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, pursuant to the 
Maryland Securities Act (“MSA”).4  I agree with the majority that the first injury gives 
rise to a classic shareholder claim that is barred by the derivative injury rule.  Where we 
part company is that the second injury, in my view, does not.   
In the bankruptcy action that led to the $400,000 judgment, Little sued Ressler 
Hardwoods and Flooring (“RHF”) and the Resslers, alleging that they misrepresented 
RHF’s financial condition in connection with the offer to sell Little 51% of RHF in 
exchange for $1.2 million.  In addition to entering a $400,000 judgment against RHF for 
its violation of MSA § 11-703(a)(1)(ii), the bankruptcy court entered judgment against 
the Resslers under MSA § 11-703(c), which imposes joint and several liability on “every 
partner, officer, or director” of a liable company who does not affirmatively demonstrate 
that he or she “did not know, and in exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of 
the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist.”5  As the 
Bankruptcy Court found, the Resslers were unable to meet this burden. 
The $400,000 judgment entered against the Resslers thus was entirely independent 
of the Resslers’ status as shareholders and, while joint and several with the company, was 
                                              
 4 Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 11-101 et seq.   
 
 5 Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 11-703(c)(1). 
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levied against the Resslers directly for the Resslers’ own acts and omissions as officers—
irrespective of whether they owned a single share of RHF stock.  The judgment, in other 
words, was not an injury flowing through the corporation and affecting all shareholders; 
it was entered against the Resslers personally for their actions as joint tortfeasors in a 
securities fraud action.  The derivative injury rule, therefore, is simply inapposite.  
Even if the derivative injury rule did pertain, however, it would not bar Shubert’s 
claims because they fit squarely into the exception for duties that are owed directly to the 
shareholder.6  The majority deems that exception inapplicable on the grounds that 
“[c]onclusory assertions of supposed duties . . . will not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion” 
and “[t]he record makes clear that Appellees’ professional services were retained by 
RHF.”7  But there was no opportunity to develop a record on this issue because Shubert’s 
complaint was dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6).  For that very reason, at the 
motion to dismiss stage, a court “must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and 
allegations [from the complaint], and must draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in 
favor of the plaintiff.”8   
Here, Shubert’s complaint expressly alleges that the Resslers themselves “engaged 
the legal services of Geisenberger and Geisenberger PC” and “engaged the financial 
services of Musso and Musso PC,” and that “[s]uch engagement resulted in a legally 
                                              
 6 See Cole v. Ford Motor Co., 566 F. Supp. 558, 569 (W.D. Pa. 1983). 
 
 7 Majority Op. 8. 
 
 8 Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 193 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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binding and enforceable contract” between the Resslers and Appellees.9  That is 
sufficient at the pleading stage to allege a direct duty owed to the Resslers, separate from 
and independent of any duties Appellees may have owed to RHF in connection with a 
separate or even joint representation of the corporate entity.10  There is no requirement, as 
the majority would have it, that the complaint allege that the subject matter of the 
representation be “independent of RHF’s business or the Resslers’ status as shareholders, 
officers, and directors of RHF.”11  Rather, if there was an attorney-client relationship or 
accountant-client relationship between Appellees and the Resslers, as alleged in the 
complaint, Appellees’ fiduciary and contractual duties would flow directly to the Resslers 
as clients, and the Resslers would have standing to bring suit for breach of those duties, 
regardless of the subject matter of the representation.12    
                                              
 9 App. 17, ¶¶ 20, 23; App. 31, ¶ 117; App. 33 ¶ 130.   
 
 10 Joint representation of an organization and an individual is permissible in 
Pennsylvania, where the Rules of Professional Conduct provide that “a lawyer for an 
organization may also represent a principal officer or major shareholder.”  Pa. R.P.C. 
1.13 n.9. 
 
 11 Majority Op. 8. 
   
 12 See Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc. v. Pitterich, 805 F.2d 96, 104 (3d Cir. 
1986) (recognizing that both the course of dealing and the conduct of parties “can 
evidence a contractual relationship between parties and thus can confer standing on an 
individual as a direct party to the agreement”); Ofalt, 85 A.3d at 549 (observing that 
when the issue is a “right belonging severally to the shareholder, or on a fraud affecting 
the shareholder directly, or where there is a duty owed to the individual independent of 
the person’s status as a shareholder, it is an individual action”) (quoting 12B Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 5911 (2013)); Bancroft Life & Cas., ICC, Ltd. 
v. Lo, 978 F. Supp. 2d 500, 508 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (recognizing that “Courts around the 
country have held that a shareholder may bring an individual suit if the defendant has 
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Despite my disagreement with the majority’s rationale, however, I agree with its 
conclusion because the complaint fails to adequately plead causation.  The MSA 
judgment relates to specific misrepresentations and omissions made by RHF and Keith 
Ressler between March 2007 and July 2007 that induced Little to invest $400,000 in July 
2007.13  Shubert’s complaint, however, claims that Appellees committed malpractice by 
improperly “devis[ing] a plan” and advising the Resslers to issue RHF shares to Little in 
October 2007 in proportion to the $400,000 that he had by that point invested.14  In other 
words, the misdeeds that gave rise to the $400,000 judgment were distinct from and 
significantly predated the stock issuance scheme that forms the basis for Shubert’s 
malpractice action.  The complaint, by its own terms, therefore fails to adequately plead 
that Appellees’ alleged malpractice, i.e., their advice concerning that stock issuance 
scheme, was the cause of the alleged injury, i.e., the $400,000 judgment entered against 
the Resslers.15   
For these reasons, I join my colleagues in affirming the judgment of the District 
Court.  
                                                                                                                                                  
violated an independent duty to the shareholder, whether or not the corporation may also 
bring an action”).    
 
 13 App. 202-07; See S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping 
Grp. Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[I]n addition to the allegations in the 
complaint,” a court considering a motion to dismiss may properly examine “public 
records, including judicial proceedings” such as “another court’s opinion.”). 
 
 14 App. 25, ¶ 76. 
 
 15 See App. 18-19.  
